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1 Introduction 
Procurement is generally described as the function of purchasing goods and 
services from an outside body.
1 In South Africa, public sector procurement or 
government procurement is estimated to amount to approximately 14% of gross 
domestic product (GDP).
2 In the United Kingdom, it is estimated that the total 
value of public procurement (excluding the procurement of public corporations) 
was £117 billion in 2002/3
3 and in the United States, the monetary value of 
public sector contracts given to the private sector is estimated to be about 15% 
of GDP.
4 Government procurement is, therefore, of huge economic 
significance. Government procurement is, moreover, of major importance for 
the economic development of a country, particularly in respect of projects 
involving infrastructure and telecommunication. A government can use its 
procurement power to promote social and policy objectives by, for example, 
promoting the development of previously disadvantaged groups. The size and 
volume of government procurement does, however, give rise to considerable 
                                            
*   This article is based on sections of the author’s unpublished doctoral thesis, The Legal 
Regulation of Government Procurement in South Africa (University of the Western Cape, 
2005). 
**   Senior Lecturer in Law, University of the Western Cape. The financial support of DAAD 
(Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst / German Academic Exchange Service) and 
the Research Development Office of the University of the Western Cape in 2004/2005 is 
gratefully acknowledged. I am also indebted to Julia Sloth-Nielsen and Tobias Van 
Reenen for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
1   Arrowsmith  et al. Regulating Public Procurement  1. Collins English Dictionary 1294 
similarly defines procurement as “the act of buying”. In the South African context, as is 
argued in greater detail elsewhere (Bolton Government Procurement ch 3, par 8.3.2.3), 
the word 'procurement', as contained in the heading of s 217 of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (the Constitution) should be given a wide interpretation. 
Procurement, in the South African context, should be understood as referring to instances 
when the government acquires goods or services and when it sells or lets assets.  
2   Mkhize “No title”.  
3   Arrowsmith Public and Utilities Procurement par 1.1 (n omitted). 
4   Amos 2005 http://www.egovmonitor.com/ 12 May. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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potential for corruption. Both contractors and public officials may resort to 
corrupt practices, and this may be for personal or political reasons. Whatever 
the underlying reasons, corruption undermines the attainment of value for 
money in government contracting, the fair treatment of contractors and the use 
of procurement as a policy tool.  
 
The South African Constitution provides that when organs of state procure 
goods or services, they must comply with five principles: fairness, equity, 
transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.
5 In short,
6 this means 
that organs of state should make use of competition when procuring goods or 
services. They should 'shop around' and attract the maximum number of 
contractors who will participate in such competition.
7 The aim should be to 
ensure the attainment of value for money – public money should be spent in an 
effective and efficient manner.
8 Those who participate in competitions should 
also be treated fairly and without bias.
9 Thus, all contracting parties should 
have equal access to competition; some contractors should not be afforded 
more time for the preparation and submission of quotes or tenders than others; 
and the same information should be made available to all contracting parties. 
Government procurement procedures should further be transparent,
10 meaning 
'public' or 'open'.
11 Thus, when organs of state procure goods or services, this 
should not be done behind closed doors. Procurement information should be 
generally available; there should be publication of general procurement rules 
and practices; government contracts should be advertised; contractors should 
be able to access information on government contract awards; and organs of 
                                            
5   S 217(1). 
6   For detailed discussion, see Bolton Government Procurement ch 3, par 4. 
7    On 'competitiveness' and competition, see Collins English Dictionary 345; OED 
http://www.oed.com/ 28 Oct; Burton Legal Thesaurus 97; Goyder EC Competition Law 8. 
8   On 'cost-effectiveness', see Collins English Dictionary 380 and 524; s 33(3)(c), 195(1)(b) 
and 215(1) of the Constitution. The COED http://www.askoxford.com 25 Jan also defines 
the word 'cost-effective' as “working productively with minimum wasted effort or expense”. 
9    On 'fairness', see Collins English Dictionary 586; Claassen Legal Words and Phrases 
228;  Burton  Legal Thesaurus 228; OED  http://www.oed.com/ 28 Oct; COED 
http://www.askoxford.com 25 Jan.  
10   S 217(1) of the Constitution. 
11   Burton Legal Thesaurus 515. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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state should disclose the criteria that will be applied in selecting a winning 
contractor.
12  
 
Depending on the nature and value of a particular contract, the use of a public 
call for tenders can generally be regarded as the best way to ensure 
compliance with the principles in section 217(1) of the Constitution, that is, 
fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.
13 By 
nature, a public call for tenders is open; it assists in the prevention of fraud or 
favouritism; and ensures that the maximum number of contractors is 
approached to participate in government procurement procedures, thus 
affording an equal opportunity to all prospective contractors to contract with the 
government. An organ of state is also in a position to compare prices and 
quality and can choose to contract with whoever offers the best deal. Most 
legislation accordingly proceeds on the basis that procurement takes place by 
way of tendering.
14 As a general rule, legislation prescribes that contracts with 
a high value (above R200 000) are subject to public tender procedures. 
 
There may, however, be instances when the circumstances of a particular case 
make the use of a public call for tenders inappropriate, regardless of the high 
value of the contract. Provision is, therefore, made in legislation for exceptions 
to the prescribed use of tendering. Since tendering is generally the best method 
to employ to ensure compliance with the principles in section 217(1) of the 
Constitution, it is important for there to be sufficient guidance on the non-use of 
tender procedures. The aim of this article is to analyse the legislation providing 
for exceptions to the use of tendering and to make recommendations on how 
                                            
12   Evenett and Hoekman Transparency 272; Arrowsmith 1998 ICLQ. 
13   A public call for tenders is also generally referred to as 'tendering', 'competitive tendering', 
'bidding', 'competitive bidding', 'sealed bidding', 'open tendering', 'a call for competition', 
'public advertisement' or 'a call for tenders'. For the purposes of this article, reference will 
primarily be made to the terms 'tendering' and 'competitive bidding'. In practice, however, 
the different terms are often used interchangeably. 
14   See, e.g., the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 (Procurement 
Act) and the Regulations thereto – Preferential Procurement Regulations GG No 22549 of 
10 August 2001. These (2001) Regulations are currently (30 April 2006) in the process of 
being redrafted – Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000 (Act 5 of 2000): 
Draft Preferential Procurement Regulations GG No 26863 of 4 October 2004. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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some of the legislative provisions should be interpreted in order to align them 
with the principles in section 217(1) of the Constitution.  
 
First, the different ways in which legislation makes provision for the non-use of 
tendering will be enquired into. Guidance will then be provided on how certain 
legislative provisions should be interpreted to ensure compliance with section 
217(1) of the Constitution. In doing so, reference will be made to international 
instruments dealing with government procurement and, specifically, the non-
use of tender procedures.
15 Readers are warned not to expect extensive 
reference to applicable case law. The reason for this is that in those instances 
where organs of state fail to make use of public tender procedures, affected 
parties are seldom aware of this. Also, even where decisions not to use tender 
procedures are known to affected parties, they are generally unlikely to 
experience such an instant or direct sense of unfairness as with decisions 
made in the course of public tender procedures. Case law dealing with the non-
use of public tender procedures is accordingly scarce, especially in the South 
African context. As far as possible, however, use will be made of practical 
examples. 
 
 
2  Exceptions as provided for in legislation 
2.1 Overview  of  legislation 
                                            
15   E.g., United States Federal Acquisition Regulations (US FAR); the UNCITRAL 
http://www.uncitral.org 28 Oct; the European Community’s new Public Procurement 
Directives (Directive 2004/18/EC on the coordination of procedures for the award of public 
works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts – [2004] Official 
Journal of the European Union L 134/114 (EC Public Sector Directive); and Directive 
2004/17/EC on coordinating the procurement procedures of entities operating in the 
water, energy, transport and postal services sectors – [2004] Official Journal of the 
European Union L 134/1 (EC Public Utilities Directive)); the WTO GPA http://www.wto.org 
28 Oct; and the new Polish Public Procurement Act. At times, reference will also be made 
to the Ministry of Finance and Public Works: Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement 
Reform in South Africa, GG  No 17928 of 14 April 1997; and the Supply Chain 
Management Policy – see City of Cape Town http://www.capetown.gov.za/ 4 Apr. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
5/38 
At national and provincial government level, the Public Finance Management 
Act (PFMA)
16 regulates financial management in the national and provincial 
governments and provides, inter alia, that the National Treasury may make 
Regulations or issue instructions, applicable to all institutions to which the 
PFMA applies, concerning –  
 
…the determination of a framework for an appropriate procurement 
and provisioning system which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective.
17  
 
The Regulations in terms of the PFMA (PFMA Regulations) have been 
promulgated
18 and the Supply Chain Management Regulations (PFMA SCM 
Regulations),
19 in particular, make provision for the implementation of supply 
chain management systems by organs of state (falling within the Regulations) 
for the acquisition of goods and services and the disposal and letting of 
government assets.
20 The Regulations provide that supply chain management 
systems implemented by organs of state must comply with the principles of 
fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.
21 The 
procurement of goods and services must further take place either by way of 
quotations or through a bidding process, and must be in accordance with the 
threshold values as determined by the National Treasury.
22  
 
The National Treasury has issued guidelines and instructions or practice notes 
on various issues relating to procurement, the aim being to ensure uniform 
minimum norms and standards within government. Of particular relevance is 
Practice Note Number SCM 2 of 2005
23 which makes provision for four types of 
procurement: petty cash purchases, verbal or written quotations, written price 
                                            
16   Act 1 of 1999, as amended by Act 29 of 1999. 
17   S 76(4)(c). 
18   National Treasury: Regulations for Departments, Trading Entities, Constitutional 
Institutions and Public Entities: Issued in terms of the Public Finance Management Act 
1999, GG No 27388 of 15 March 2005. 
19   Can be found in reg 16A of the PFMA Regulations. 
20   Reg 16A3.1. 
21   Reg 16A3.2. 
22   Reg 16A6.1. 
23   National Treasury 2005 http://www.treasury.gov.za/ 14 Apr. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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quotations and competitive bidding. Petty cash purchases are prescribed for 
contracts up to R2 000, written or verbal quotations are prescribed for contracts 
over R2 000 but under R10 000, written price quotations should be obtained for 
contracts over R10 000 but under R200 000, and competitive bidding should be 
used for contracts over R200 000. The rule, therefore, is that the procurement 
of goods or services above R200 000 is subject to formal procedures, that is, 
public tender procedures.  
 
Very similar provisions are contained in the legislation applicable to local 
government. The Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 
(MFMA)
24 aims, inter alia –  
 
…[t]o secure sound and sustainable management of the financial 
affairs of municipalities and other institutions in the local sphere of 
government.
25  
 
The MFMA provides that organs of state (falling within the ambit of the Act) 
must have and implement a supply chain management policy which is 'fair, 
equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective'.
26 A supply chain 
management policy must also comply with a prescribed regulatory framework
27 
which complies with the principles of fairness, equity, transparency, 
competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.
28  
 
The Supply Chain Management Regulations to the MFMA (MFMA SCM 
Regulations) have been promulgated
29 and make provision for a range of 
procurement processes.
30 Petty cash purchases are prescribed for contracts up 
to R2 000, written or verbal quotations are prescribed for contracts over R2 000 
but below R10 000, formal written price quotations should be obtained for 
                                            
24   Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003.  
25   Preamble to the MFMA. 
26   S 111 read with s 112(1). 
27   See the whole of s 112(1). 
28   S 112(2).  
29   Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 2003: Municipal Supply Chain 
Management Regulations GG No 27636 of 30 May 2005. 
30   MFMA SCM reg 12. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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contracts over R10 000 but below R200 000, and competitive bidding should be 
used for contracts over R200 000 and for contracts with a duration period 
exceeding one year.
31 Provision is also made for a two-stage bidding process
32 
for –  
 
(a) large complex projects; (b) projects where it may be undesirable 
to prepare complete detailed technical specifications; or (c) long term 
projects with a duration period exceeding three years.
33  
 
Of particular relevance, therefore, is that a public tender process is prescribed 
for contracts exceeding one year and for procurements above R200 000.
34 
Contracts for the provision of banking services must also be procured by way of 
tender procedures.
35  
 
At all three levels of government, the requirement for the use of public tender 
procedures is not without exception. In the ensuing paragraph, attention will be 
given to the different ways in which legislation (at all three levels of 
government) makes provision for exceptions to the prescribed use of tendering. 
Thereafter, an analysis will be offered of such legislation. It is important to note 
that attention will not be given to the use of petty cash purchases, written or 
verbal quotations, formal written price quotations, or two-stage bidding. The 
                                            
31   Reg 12(2)(a) provides that “[a] supply chain management policy may allow the accounting 
officer to lower, but not to increase, the different threshold values specified in 
subregulation (1)”. Written or verbal quotations may, e.g., be obtained for contracts under 
R2 000, formal written price quotations may be obtained for contracts under R10 000, or 
competitive bidding may be used for contracts under R200 000 (reg 12(2)(b)). A supply 
chain management policy must also state that “goods or services may not deliberately be 
split into parts or items of a lesser value merely to avoid complying with the requirements 
of the policy” (reg 12(3)(a)).  
32   Also referred to as 'restricted invitation' or 'selective tendering'. 
33   Reg 25(1). In terms of a two-stage bidding process, a public call for 'proposals to tender', 
'expressions of interest' or 'requests to tender' go out and contractors are invited to submit 
detailed technical and cost proposals by a specified date. The number of proposals 
received is then reduced. Only those contractors who are identified as most likely to 
provide responsive and cost-effective tenders, and are most likely to perform in terms of 
their contractual obligations, are then invited to tender. The actual process of tendering is 
thus limited to a 'reasonable' number of contractors so that an organ of state’s resources 
for tender evaluation is not unnecessarily strained by the need to review tenders 
submitted by unqualified contractors.  
34   MFMA SCM reg 12(1)(d). 
35   MFMA SCM reg 30(1). P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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primary focus will be on the prescribed use of public tender procedures and the 
exceptions provided for in legislation for the non-use of such procedures.  
 
 
2.2  Prescribed exceptions to public tendering 
 
2.2.1  When 'impractical', in case of 'emergencies' and/or 'sole providers'
36  
 
At national and provincial government level, Practice Note Number SCM 2 of 
2005 provides for the non-use of tender procedures if it is “impractical to invite 
competitive bids”, for example, in the case of 'emergencies' or a 'sole 
supplier'.
37 In such instances, procurement may take place by other means, 
such as price quotations or negotiations, provided that a record is kept of the 
reasons for deviating from an invitation for competitive bids and such reasons 
are approved by the relevant authority.
38 The PFMA SCM Regulations contain 
a similar provision.
39  
 
At local government level, organs of state may also dispense with official 
procurement processes, and these include public tender procedures, and 
procure goods or services “through any convenient process, which may include 
direct negotiations”.
40 This may, however, only be done in case of 
'emergencies'; if the goods or services are only available from a 'single 
provider'; or in 'any other exceptional case' where it is 'impractical or impossible' 
to follow official procurement procedures.
41 The reasons for any deviations 
must be recorded and reported to the next meeting of the council, or board of 
                                            
36    It is useful, at this stage, to discuss these three grounds under one heading. When 
guidelines are, however, provided for the interpretation of the different grounds (see par 4 
below), the grounds will be examined separately. 
37   Par 4.4. 
38   Ibid. 
39   Reg 16A6.4. 
40   MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a). 
41    MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a)(i), 36(1)(a)(ii) and 36(1)(a)(v). Organs of state may also 
dispense with official procurement processes (including tender procedures) for “the 
acquisition of special works of art or historical objects where specifications are difficult to 
compile”; and the acquisition of animals for zoos (MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a)(iii) and 
36(1)(a)(iv)).  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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directors in the case of a municipal entity, and a note to this effect must be 
included in the annual financial statements.
42 
 
2.2.2  Municipal service delivery by another organ of state 
 
In the municipal service delivery context, there is no need to make use of 
competition, and this includes tender procedures, if an organ of state contracts 
with another organ of state (as opposed to a private party) for the delivery of a 
municipal service.
43 There are many rules and procedures in place for the 
contracting out of municipal services.
44 The five principles in section 217(1) of 
the Constitution are, for example, repeated in section 83(1)(a) of the Municipal 
Systems Act, but they only find application when a municipality decides to 
make use of a private party for the delivery of a municipal service and not when 
use is made of another organ of state.
45 The position appears to be the same 
insofar as the disposal of capital assets is concerned.
46 The principles of 
                                            
42   MFMA SCM reg 36(2). This reg (36(2)) does not apply to the procurement of, e.g., water 
and electricity (MFMA SCM reg 36(3)). See also s 10G(5)(c) of the Local Government 
Transition Act 209 of 1993 (Local Government Transition Act) which provides that a 
municipality may dispense with the calling of tenders “within such limits as may be 
prescribed by a national law”. 
43   S 76 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000, as amended by Act 44 
of 2003 (Municipal Systems Act) expressly provides that a municipality can either deliver 
municipal services itself (in-house) or use can be made of an external provider. A 
'municipal service', in turn, is defined as  “a service that a municipality in terms of its 
powers and functions provides or may provide to or for the benefit of the local community 
irrespective of whether (a) such a service is provided, or to be provided, by the 
municipality through an internal mechanism contemplated in section 76 or by engaging an 
external mechanism contemplated in section 76; and (b) fees, charges or tariffs are levied 
in respect of such a service or not” (s 35 of the Local Government Laws Amendment Act 
51 of 2002 which amends s 1 of the Municipal Systems Act).  
44   See ch 8 of the Municipal Systems Act. 
45   S 80(1) of the Municipal Systems Act provides that “[i]f a municipality decides to provide a 
[municipal] service through a service delivery agreement in terms of section 76(b) with (a) 
a municipal entity, another municipality or a national or provincial organ of state, it may 
negotiate and enter into such an agreement with the relevant municipal entity, municipality 
or organ of state without applying Part 3 of this Chapter; or (b) any institution or entity or 
any person, juristic or natural, not mentioned in paragraph (a), it must apply Part 3 of this 
Chapter before entering into such an agreement with any such institution, entity or 
person” (emphasis added). Part 3 of the Act, inter alia, repeats the principles laid down in 
s 217(1) of the Constitution and provides (in s 83(1)) that “[i]f a municipality decides to 
provide a municipal service through a service delivery agreement with a person referred 
to in section 80(1)(b), it must select the service provider through selection processes 
which (a) are competitive, fair, transparent, equitable and cost-effective”.  
46   S 14 of the MFMA.  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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fairness, equity, transparency and competitiveness (not cost-effectiveness) are 
repeated in section 14(5) of the MFMA. Section 14(6), however, provides that 
'this section', in other words, the whole of section 14 – 
 
…does  not apply to the transfer of a capital asset to another 
municipality or to a municipal entity or to a national or provincial 
organ of state in circumstances and in respect of categories of 
assets approved by the National Treasury, provided that such 
transfers are in accordance with a prescribed framework.
47  
 
It would appear that the reason for the non-application of the principles in the 
above instances, and thus also the non-use of tender procedures, is that all 
organs of state are entities exercising powers on behalf of the state. No organ 
of state is separate from the state – the state, through its organs, at all times 
functions as a unit. Thus, when a municipality, for example, contracts with 
another organ of state for the delivery of a municipal service, the service will 
still be provided by the state. There is, accordingly, no need for the principles in 
section 217(1) of the Constitution to find application. There is, therefore, no 
need for tender procedures. It is submitted, however, that even though the 
principles in section 217(1) do not find application where a municipality 
contracts with another organ of state for the delivery of a municipal service, for 
example, municipalities must, as a general rule, always comply with the 
principle of transparency.
48 The public, as taxpayers, have a right to 
government contracting procedures that are open and transparent irrespective 
of whether a municipality contracts with a private party or another organ of 
state. This is in line with one of the core aims of the Constitution, that is, to “lay 
the foundations for a democratic and open society”.
49  
 
Where a municipality is not specifically contracting with another organ of state 
for the delivery of a municipal service, and/or is contracting for goods or 
                                            
47   Emphasis added.  
48    Penfold and Reyburn Public Procurement 25-11 (n 1) note that an exception to 
compliance with the principle of transparency may be “where compelling reasons, such as 
national security, militate against disclosing any issues relating to the proposed contract”. 
The writers, however, caution that “[t]his would only arise in highly exceptional 
circumstances”. See also par 4.1.4 below. 
49   See the Preamble to the Constitution (emphasis added).  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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services in general, it would appear that the municipality will be bound by 
section 217, and thus the use of tender procedures, irrespective of whether a 
contract is ultimately concluded with a private party or another organ of state.
50 
The same applies to instances where an organ of state in the national or 
provincial government sphere contracts for goods or services. It is submitted 
that this will particularly be the case where commercial entities performing 
public powers or functions participate in the procurement process. Such 
entities, as organs of state, will have a right to procurement procedures that are 
fair, equitable, transparent, competitive and cost-effective.
51 
 
2.2.3  Participation in a transversal term contract 
 
The National Treasury facilitates the arrangement of contracts, referred to as 
transversal term contracts, for the procurement of goods and services required 
by more than one government department provided that the arrangement of 
such contracts is cost-effective and in the national interest.
52 The PFMA SCM 
Regulations (applicable to national and provincial government) accordingly 
provide that if an organ of state participates in a transversal term contract 
facilitated by the relevant treasury, it may not call for tenders for the same or 
similar product or service during the existence of the transversal term 
contract.
53  
 
2.2.4  Contracts arranged by other organs of state  
 
The PFMA SCM Regulations (applicable to national and provincial government) 
provide that an organ of state may partake in any contract arranged by means 
of a tender process by any other organ of state, subject to the written approval 
                                            
50   See, however, cl 261.4.4 of the Supply Chain Management Policy – City of Cape Town 
http://www.capetown.gov.za/ 4 Apr, which makes provision for the non-use of a tendering 
process in relation to “any contract with an organ of state, a local authority or a public 
utility corporation or company”. 
51   S 217(1) of the Constitution. 
52   National Treasury http://www.treasury.go.za/ 14 Apr. 
53   Reg 16A6.5.  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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of such organ of state and the relevant contractors.
54 There is thus no need for 
an organ of state to conduct its own tender procedures. If the needs of an 
organ of state (X) are similar to the needs of another organ of state (Y), and Y 
has already arranged to meet its needs by means of tender procedures, X can 
simply arrange with Y to make use of the same contractor that Y selected to 
satisfy its needs. The contractor concerned should, however, as noted, also 
agree to the arrangement in writing.  
 
Organs of state at local government level may similarly procure goods or 
services under a contract secured by another organ of state by means of tender 
procedures.
55 There would, therefore, be no need to make use of tender 
procedures under these circumstances. The conditions, however, are the 
following: (a) the organ of state that initially secured the contract must have 
done so by way of a tender process; (b) the organ of state who wants to 
participate in the contract should have no reason to believe that the contract 
was not validly procured; (c) the organ of state who wants to participate in the 
contract should obtain 'demonstrable discounts or benefits' as a consequence; 
and (d) the other organ of state and the provider must give written approval to 
the procurement in question.
56  
 
 
3  Analysis of legislation 
The legislative provisions applicable to national, provincial and local 
government do not provide sufficient guidance on the non-use of tender 
procedures. This is particularly the case with regard to instances when it is 
'impractical' to call for tenders, and in the case of 'emergencies' and the use of 
'single source procurement'. The PFMA SCM Regulations (applicable to 
                                            
54    Reg 16A6.6. See also City of Cape Town http://www.capetown.gov.za/ 4 Apr, Supply 
Chain Management Policy cl 261.4.5. 
55   MFMA SCM reg 32(1). 
56   MFMA SCM reg 32(1)(a)-(d). An organ of state or municipality need not meet the latter 
two conditions if the goods or services are procured “through a contract secured by its 
parent municipality” or the goods or services are procured “through a contract secured by 
a municipal entity of which it [the municipality] is the parent municipality” (MFMA SCM reg 
32(2)). P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
13/38 
national and provincial government), for example, provide for procurement 'by 
other means' where it is 'impractical' to invite tenders but no guidance is given 
as to when, and in what instances, the calling of tenders would be 
'impractical'.
57 There is also no guidance in the Regulations on what is meant 
by 'other means' of procurement. Provision is also made for reasons to be 
submitted to the relevant authority for deviating from inviting tenders, but no 
suggestions are made as to what kinds of reasons would justify the deviation.
58 
There is, therefore, a wide discretion in this regard.  
 
Practice Note Number SCM 2 of 2005 sheds some light on when the calling of 
tenders may be 'impractical' and when use may be made of 'other means' of 
procurement. Specific reference is made to “urgent or emergency cases or in 
case of a sole supplier”
59 and procurement by other means, “such as price 
quotations or negotiations”.
60 Still, however, no guidance is given on what may 
constitute an 'emergency' or situations that may warrant the use of 'single 
source procurement'. 
 
At local government level, the MFMA SCM Regulations similarly refer to 
'emergency' situations and where goods are available from 'a single provider' 
as justification for the non-use of tender procedures.
61 Reference is also made 
to procurement “through any convenient process, which may include direct 
negotiations”.
62 As is the case at national and provincial government level, 
however, no guidance is given on what may constitute an 'emergency' or 
situations that may warrant the use of 'single source procurement'. 
 
                                            
57   Reg 16A6.4.  
58   Ibid. 
59   Par 4.4. See also a 22 of UNCITRAL http://www.uncitral.org 28 Oct which provides that a 
procuring entity may engage in 'single-source procurement' in a number of situations, 
including where the goods, construction or services are 'urgently required'. 
60   Par 4.4. 
61   MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a)(i) and 36(1)(a)(ii). See also s 10G(5)(c) of the Local Government 
Transition Act which provides that “[a] municipality may dispense with the calling of 
tenders in the case of an emergency”. 
62   MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a). P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
14/38 
For contracts with a high value (above R200 000), tendering is the best way to 
ensure compliance with the principles in section 217(1) of the Constitution, that 
is, fairness, equity, transparency, competitiveness and cost-effectiveness.
63 
Proper guidance on exceptions to the use of tender procedures is, therefore, 
crucial. It will, to a large extent, ensure uniformity insofar as the submission of 
reasons is concerned, and ensure transparency in government procurement 
procedures which will, in turn, assist in the combating of corruption. The aim in 
the ensuing paragraph is to make suggestions for the interpretation of the 
relevant legislative provisions providing for exceptions to the use of tendering in 
order to align them with the principles in section 217(1) of the Constitution. 
 
 
4  Suggested guidelines for interpreting legislative provisions 
In this paragraph, guidance will be provided on (1) instances when the use of 
tendering may be 'impractical';
64 (2) circumstances that may amount to 
'emergencies';
65 and (3) circumstances that may warrant the use of 'single 
source procurement'.
66  
 
4.1  When tendering may be 'impractical' 
4.1.1 Unknown  specifications 
The use of tendering may be 'impractical' where, for example, repairs need to 
be done and it is not possible for an organ of state to ascertain the nature or 
                                            
63   See also par 1 supra. 
64   As provided for in reg 16A6.4 of the PFMA SCM Regulations, par 4.4 in Practice Note 
Number SCM 2 of 2005, and MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a)(v). 
65   As provided for in par 4.4 in Practice Note Number SCM 2 of 2005, reg 16A6.4 of the 
PFMA SCM Regulations, and MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a)(i). 
66   As provided for in par 4.4 in Practice Note Number SCM 2 of 2005, reg 16A6.4 of the 
PFMA SCM Regulations, and MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a)(ii).  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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extent of the work required.
67 Characteristically, a call for tenders requires an 
organ of state to specify its needs to potential contractors. A call for tenders 
must thus contain detailed specifications to enable interested parties to prepare 
and submit responsive tenders. Where specifications are not known to an 
organ of state, a public tender process is clearly impractical.
68 The MFMA SCM 
Regulations (applicable to local government) give recognition to this and 
stipulate one instance when an organ of state may deviate from official 
procurement processes, that is, when acquiring –  
 
…special works of art or historical objects where specifications are 
difficult to compile.
69  
 
 
4.1.2  Receipt of no, 'inappropriate' or 'unacceptable' tenders 
A tender procedure may be 'impractical' where there has been a call for tenders 
and no tenders, or 'inappropriate' or 'unacceptable' tenders were received. 
Tenders may be regarded as 'inappropriate' or 'unacceptable' if the prices 
offered were too high; unsuitable technical solutions were offered; none of the 
tenders received complied with the specifications and conditions of the tender 
call;
70 and/or there has been collusion in the submission of tenders.
71 An organ 
of state may then make use of some other procurement method, for example, 
verbal or written quotations, or written price quotations since calling for tenders 
a second time may be too costly. It may also be able to do away with 
competition entirely and enter into negotiations with a particular supplier. 
                                            
67    See also cl 261.4.7 of the Supply Chain Management Policy – City of Cape Town 
http://www.capetown.gov.za/ 4 Apr; and the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement 
Reform, cl 4.15. 
68   A useful method of procurement to use in such a case may be to invite contractors to 
submit 'on the site quotations'. Doing so will ensure that procurement is still competitive.  
69   MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a)(iii). See also note 41 supra. 
70   S 1(i) of the Procurement Act defines an 'acceptable tender' as "any tender which, in all 
respects, complies with the specifications and conditions of tender as set out in the tender 
document”.  
71   See also a XV par 1(a) of the WTO GPA http://www.wto.org 28 Oct; a 62(1)(1) of the new 
Polish Public Procurement Act; a 31(1)(a) of the EC Public Sector Directive; and a 
40(3)(a) of the EC Public Utilities Directive.  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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However, this form of procurement, that is, single source procurement, is open 
to abuse and is dealt with in greater detail below.
72 
 
4.1.3 Best  value 
The use of tendering may be 'impractical' for reasons exclusively related to best 
value. An organ of state may, for example, protect its future procurement 
interests and award a contract to a particular contractor to enable it to stay in 
the market and so avoid a monopoly situation in the specific goods or services 
in future.
73 An organ of state may also be confronted with 'bargain purchases' 
where it is possible to obtain goods by taking advantage of a particularly 
beneficial opportunity available for a very short period of time at a price 
significantly lower than ordinary market prices.
74 Goods may also be available –  
 
…on particularly advantageous terms from either a supplier which is 
definitely winding up its business activities, or the receivers or 
liquidators of a bankruptcy, an arrangement with creditors, or a 
similar procedure under national laws or regulations.
75 
 
4.1.4 National  security 
Reasons of national security could justify the non-use of tender procedures.
76 
This is likely to be the case where a call for tenders would require the 
circulation of specifications for military equipment.
77 This, of course, does not 
mean that a contract for military equipment may necessarily be awarded 
                                            
72   Par 4.3.  
73   Arrowsmith Procurement and Judicial Review 64.  
74   A XV par 1(i) of the WTO GPA http://www.wto.org 28 Oct; a 31(2)(d) of the EC Public 
Sector Directive; and a 40(3)(j) of the EC Public Utilities Directive. See also Trepte Public 
Procurement in the EC 131. 
75    A 31(2)(d) of the EC Public Sector Directive; and a 40(3)(j) of the EC Public Utilities 
Directive. 
76   See a 19(1)(c) of UNCITRAL http://www.uncitral.org 28 Oct; US FAR 6.302-6. Contracts 
that involve national defence or national security may also justify the non-use of 
competition altogether or the use of single source procurement. On the use of single 
source procurement, see par 4.3 below. 
77   Arrowsmith Procurement and Judicial Review 64. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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without resorting to some form of competitive procedure.
78 An organ of state 
may, for example, dispense with a call for tenders, for fear of making its military 
requirements known to a potential enemy, but nevertheless “conduct a 
competition amongst invited and trusted [contractors]”.
79 At national and 
provincial government level, Practice Note Number SCM 2 of 2005 makes 
provision for procurement “by other means, such as price quotations or 
negotiations”.
80 Where procurement takes place “by other means, such as price 
quotations or negotiations”, however, it is (still) important that all contractors 
who are invited to participate have access to the relevant documentation, 
requirements and guidelines on an equal basis. This will ensure genuine 
competition and fairness to all concerned.  
 
4.1.5  Professional advice or services  
At local government level, the MFMA SCM Regulations stipulate that an organ 
of state must make use of tendering for the appointment of consultants in the 
case of contracts above R200 000 or contracts that exceed one year.
81 It is 
submitted, however, that the use of public tendering may be 'impractical' where 
a consultant will be required to “provide professional advice or services”.
82 A 
tender procedure, by nature, requires an organ of state to provide detailed 
specifications to enable contractors to prepare and submit responsive tenders. 
The provision of detailed specifications may be very difficult where an organ of 
state needs professional advice or services – an organ of state may not 
necessarily know the nature, extent or scope of services to be performed. It is 
particularly in the area of “research and development, policy formulation, 
                                            
78   Arrowsmith et al. Regulating Public Procurement 550 point out that “[n]ational security by 
itself does not necessarily justify single source procurement [i.e., the non-use of 
competition]. In fact, it may justify competition, albeit on a limited basis to maintain a 
mobilisation base”. According to the writers, much will depend on the nature and 
importance of the particular goods or services. The question also arises as to the meaning 
or interpretation of the term 'national security' and whether this interpretation may be 
challenged by interested and affected parties. 
79   Arrowsmith et al. Regulating Public Procurement 582. See also US FAR 6.302-6. 
80   Par 4.4.  
81   MFMA SCM reg 35(2). 
82   See City of Cape Town http://www.capetown.gov.za 28 Oct: Procurement Policy Initiative 
vol 4 cl 7.1.1; and US FAR 6.302-3. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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human resource development, community-based developments and the like” 
that it is difficult to define the scope of services prior to the actual 
commencement of work.
83 A more appropriate procurement method in these 
instances would be the use of two-stage bidding. 
 
4.1.6 Other 
The use of tendering may be 'impractical' for the publication of notices and 
advertisements or where an organ of state is able to acquire goods at a public 
auction sale.
84 In the latter case, the reasoning is obvious – the purchase in 
question will already encompass a competitive procedure. In the former case, 
on the other hand, a tender process in itself would require the publication of 
notices and advertisements, that is, a call for tenders.  
 
It has further been held
85 that where a municipality created a legitimate 
expectation that a particular party would be afforded preference in buying 
certain immovable property, the municipality can be prevented from calling for 
tenders for the sale of such property.
86 In Ngoasheng v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality,
87 the court held that the applicant should have been afforded a 
right of preference to purchase the immovable property before the decision was 
made to call for tenders. Having occupied the property in question for an 
extended period of time (23 years), and in light of the negotiations that took 
place between the applicant and the municipality (the applicant on numerous 
occasions offered to purchase the property), a legitimate expectation was 
                                            
83   Cl 4.5 in the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform. See also a 19(1)(a) and 
19(1)(b) of UNCITRAL http://www.uncitral.org 28 Oct; a 62(1)(3) of the new Polish Public 
Procurement Act; a 31(2)(a) of the EC Public Sector Directive; and a 40(3)(b) of the EC 
Public Utilities Directive. See further Turpin Government Procurement and Contracts 4; 
Bright Public Procurement Handbook 39; Trepte Public Procurement in the EC 128-129. 
See also par 4.1.1 supra. 
84   See, e.g., Supply Chain Management Policy cl 261.4.1 and 261.4.3 – City of Cape Town 
http://www.capetown.gov.za/ 4 Apr. 
85   Ngoasheng v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality [2004] JOL 12953 (T). 
86   In Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] 3 All ER 935 (HL) 
944a, Lord Fraser said that a “[l]egitimate, or reasonable, expectation may arise either 
from an express promise given on behalf of a public authority or from the existence of a 
regular practice which the claimant can reasonably expect to continue”. 
87   Ngoasheng v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality [2004] JOL 12953 (T). P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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created that the applicant would receive preference in buying the property. The 
court held that the municipality’s actions in calling for tenders for the said 
property were not transparent or fair to the applicant. The court therefore 
ordered the municipality to afford the applicant first preference to purchase the 
property based on a fair price, and that the applicant be given 30 days within 
which to comply with the offer. If the applicant failed to meet the requirements 
of the offer, the municipality would be entitled to call for tenders for the sale of 
the property.
88 
 
4.2  Circumstances that may amount to 'emergencies'
89 
Provision is made in legislation at all three levels of government for the non-use 
of tendering in emergency situations but no guidance is given on situations that 
may amount to emergencies. The Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement 
Reform may be used as a guideline when interpreting procurement legislation 
that deals with emergencies. It provides that emergency situations may include, 
for example –  
 
…[t]he possibility of human injury or death; [t]he prevalence of 
human suffering or deprivation of rights; [t]he possibility of damage 
to property, or suffering and death of livestock and animals; [t]he 
interruption of essential services, including transportation and 
communication facilities; [t]he possibility that the security of the State 
could be compromised; [t]he possibility of serious damage occurring 
to the natural environment; [and/or] [t]he possibility that failure to 
take necessary action may result in the State not being able to 
render an essential community service.
90 
 
The prevailing situation or imminent danger should, however, – 
                                            
88   Ibid, par 15. 
89   In the United States case of Scaccia v Borough of Old Forge 373 Pa 161, 163; 94 A.2d 
563, 564 Pa (1953), the court said that “[i]t is difficult to define an emergency but as a 
generalization it is a sudden or unexpected event which creates a temporarily dangerous 
condition usually necessitating immediate or quick action….Ordinary conditions or 
customarily existing conditions are not emergencies”. For certain key features of 
emergency procurement, see also Schwarts “Katrina’s lessons" 2-6. See also generally 
Katayama 1968-1969 PCLJ; and US FAR 6.302-2.  
90   Cl 4.15. See also City of Cape Town http://www.capetown.gov.za/ 4 Apr: Supply Chain 
Management Policy cl 265. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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…be of such a scale and nature that it could not readily be alleviated 
by interim measures, in order to allow time for normal procurement 
systems to be used.
91 
 
 Available details of the nature and extent of the work and services required 
should also be inadequate to allow an accelerated or normal procurement 
system to be used.
92 During World War I, for example, many contracts in the 
United States were exempted from the strictness of formal advertising on the 
basis of 'public exigency'.
93 More recently, the United States had to respond to 
the natural disaster commonly known as Hurricane Katrina. The United States’ 
procurement response in this instance is a good illustration of when a 
government opted to make use of emergency procurement procedures 
because accelerated or normal procurement procedures were inappropriate 
under the circumstances.
94  
 
It should be cautioned that emergency procurement should not be used to 
evade the use of standard procurement procedures; as a consequence of 
insufficient stock-levels for items that are used on a daily basis; as a result of 
working programmes not adequately planned for; or as a result of no or 
insufficient communication between warehouses and buying offices.
95 Thus, it 
is important that the circumstances giving rise to an emergency were not 
foreseeable by an organ of state, or be the result of negligent conduct on the 
part of an organ of state.
96  
                                            
91   Cl 4.15 in the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform. See also City of Cape 
Town http://www.capetown.gov.za/ 4 Apr: Supply Chain Management Policy cl 266. 
92   Cl 4.15 in the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform. 
93   Katayama 1968-1969 PCLJ 240. 
94    For criticism of the United States government’s response to Hurricane Katrina, see 
Schwarts “Katrina’s lessons". See also generally, Pool and Welch 2005 
http://summitinsight.com/ 25 Jul. See further Madsen et al 2002 http://mayerbrown.com/ 
26 Jul  on procurement practices being advocated or previously undertaken in 
emergencies in the United States. The paper identifies potential pitfalls for the United 
States government if these practices are not properly managed.  
95   See City of Cape Town http://www.capetown.gov.za 28 Oct: Procurement Policy Initiative 
vol 4 cl 7.1.7.  
96   See also a 19(2)(a) of UNCITRAL http://www.uncitral.org 28 Oct; a 62(1)(4) of the new 
Polish Public Procurement Act; a 31(1)(c) of the EC Public Sector Directive; and a 
40(3)(d) of the EC Public Utilities Directive. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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It is important to note, furthermore, that even in those instances when an 
emergency situation does warrant the non-use of tender procedures, this does 
not mean that an organ of state may do away with a competitive procurement 
process altogether.
97 Organs of state should still be required, in order to ensure 
compliance with, in particular, the principles of competitiveness and cost-
effectives in section 217(1) of the Constitution, to procure the necessary goods 
or services on the best possible terms. The City of Cape Town Supply Chain 
Management Policy
98 makes provision for this and provides that in emergency 
situations, and where possible, at least three quotes must nevertheless be 
obtained, failing which the procedures followed must be formalised in a report 
to the city manager as soon as possible.
99 Organs of state should, furthermore, 
where use is made of emergency procurement procedures, carefully consider 
limiting the value and length of contracts concluded in order to address only the 
immediate emergency. In this way, ongoing needs and requirements can, as far 
as possible and where appropriate, be met by way of public tender procedures. 
 
 
4.3  The use of 'single source procurement' 
The use of tendering may be inappropriate in instances where there is only one 
potential provider or authorised provider for the goods or services in question. 
This is likely to be the case in respect of creative and artistic works; the 
protection of exclusive rights, such as patents or copyright; or the absence of 
competition for technical reasons.
100 In such instances, an organ of state may 
                                            
97   See cl 4.15 in the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform. 
98   City of Cape Town http://www.capetown.gov.za/ 4 Apr. 
99   Cl 267. See also Anon 2004 J of Public Procurement. The author makes reference to a 
number of existing tools in the United States whose flexibility, in the author’s opinion, may 
prove to be advantageous in the case of emergency procurements. Examples include: 
competition among pre-qualified sources; verbal solicitations; and limited source 
selections. See also Schwarts “Katrina’s lessons"; and US FAR 6.302-2. 
100  A XV par 1(b) of the WTO GPA http://www.wto.org 28 Oct; a 67(1) of the new Polish 
Public Procurement Act; a 31(1)(b) of the EC Public Sector Directive; a 40(3)(c) of the EC 
Public Utilities Directive; and US FAR 6.302-1. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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resort to 'single source procurement'.
101 An organ of state may, in other words, 
enter into negotiations with a specific provider for the procurement of goods or 
services.
102 By nature, however, single source procurement lends itself to 
abuse. In the typical single source procurement, there is no competition or price 
mechanism. A contractor that knows that it is the only source has no reason to 
offer competitive pricing. No competitive market exists to provide incentives to 
the contractor. Single source procurement is possibly also the least transparent 
of all award procedures. It is in the interests of governments, therefore, to 
reduce single source awards.
103 
 
At national and provincial government level, Practice Note Number SCM 2 of 
2005 makes provision for the non-use of tendering “in the case of a sole 
supplier”.
104 At local government level, the MFMA SCM Regulations also 
provide that organs of state may dispense with official procurement processes 
and procure goods or services through any convenient process, which may 
include direct negotiations but only if, inter alia, “such goods or services are 
produced or available from a single provider only”.
105 No guidance is, however, 
given on situations that may warrant the use of 'single source procurement'. In 
the ensuing paragraph, guidance is provided on possible situations that may 
warrant the use of single source procurement.  
 
4.3.1 Intellectual  property  rights 
The use of single source procurement may be warranted where, as noted 
above, there are intellectual property rights involved such as patents, 
                                            
101 Also referred to as 'sole source procurement', 'directed contracting', 'negotiated 
procurement' or 'single tendering' (Arrowsmith et al Regulating Public Procurement). See 
also generally Turpin Government Procurement and Contracts 144-146. 
102  See a 22 of UNCITRAL http://www.uncitral.org 28 Oct which provides that a procuring 
entity may engage in 'single-source procurement' in a number of situations, including 
where the goods, construction or services are only available from one supplier or 
contractor.  
103  See also Arrowsmith et al Regulating Public Procurement 537. 
104  Par 4.4.  
105  MFMA SCM reg 36(1)(a)(ii).  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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trademarks or copyrights.
106 Where a contractor is the rightholder of an 
innovative product, design or manufacturing process for which there is no 
equivalent, an organ of state may have no option but to contract with the 
rightholder. Failure to do so may prevent the organ of state from having access 
to the latest technology.
107 Trepte
108 correctly cautions, however, that in order 
to resort to single source procurement for reasons of intellectual property rights, 
 
it will be necessary to demonstrate that there are, in fact, no 
alternatives. Simply to prefer one type of process which is subject to 
exclusive rights (which happens to be national) over an alternative 
process which is itself the subject of exclusive rights may not be 
sufficient to trigger the derogation. Similarly, holders of exclusive 
rights may also licence others to manufacture patented products or 
to use their technical knowledge or manufacturing process. This will 
happen particularly in cases where undertakings get together to form 
joint ventures or where subcontractors need to use the proprietary 
rights held by the contractors in order to fulfil their contractual 
obligations. The existence of licensees may well give rise to the 
availability of the protected product from several sources, a situation 
which would militate against the use of this derogation.  
 
One of the recent 'questionable contracts' in the City of Cape Town concerns 
the award of a 'jewellery city contract'.
109 It is reported that the contract was 
awarded to a consultant (contractor) without the calling of tenders. The City 
claims that the contract was awarded to the successful contractor because it 
was an expert in the field and also, that the contract was of an urgent nature. A 
contractor who later learned of the award of the contract, however, claims that 
the contract should have been awarded to it since it 'initiated' the jewellery 
project. The contractor accordingly intends to sue for intellectual theft.
110 The 
                                            
106  On the law of patents, trade marks and copyright generally, see Havenga et al Principles 
of Commercial Law ch 18. See also the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993; the Copyright Act 
98 of 1978; and the Patents Act 57 of 1978.  
107  Trepte Public Procurement in the EC 123. 
108  Trepte Public Procurement in the EC 124. 
109  Anon 2005 http://www.DailyTenders.co.za 14 Apr; Anon 2005 http://www.iafrica.com 14 
Apr; Powell Cape Times 8 December 2005 1. 
110  Ibid. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
24/38 
jewellery city contract is currently (30 April 2006) among a number of contracts 
concluded by the City of Cape Town that are the subject of investigations.
111 
 
4.3.2  Necessary additional and unforeseen work
112 
It may be necessary to suspend the use of competition, and therefore tender 
procedures, where necessary additional and unforeseen work needs to be 
carried out under an existing contract and the work cannot be technically 
separated from the main contract without great inconvenience.
113 The same 
applies in the case of the repetition of similar work, that is, work originally 
awarded by way of competitive (tender) procedures that needs to conform to a 
basic project.
114 In the latter instance, however, it is important for legislation to 
stipulate a time period within which contracts may be awarded to the same 
contractor. It is suggested that legislation should stipulate that a contract may 
only be awarded to a particular contractor on the ground of repetition of similar 
work during the three years following the award of the original contract to such 
contractor.
115 
                                            
111  Powell Cape Times 11 April 2006 1, 3 and 10; Powell Cape Times 13 April 2006 3. For 
the author’s view on the 'jewellery city contract', see par 4.3.4 below. 
112  Can also loosely be referred to as 'the extension of contracts'. 
113  See US FAR 6.302-1. See also Powell Cape Times 12 April 2006 1 who reports on a R5 
million contract which was extended by R3 million by the City of Cape Town without the 
use of tender procedures. It is reported that the non-use of tender procedures was 
reasoned (by the City of Cape Town) to be in the 'public interest'. The non-use of tender 
procedures is, however, likely to be the subject of an investigation. 
114 See Arrowsmith Procurement and Judicial Review 64; Bright Public Procurement 
Handbook 38; Trepte Public Procurement in the EC 128. See also a 22 of UNCITRAL 
http://www.uncitral.org 28 Oct  which provides that a procuring entity may engage in 
'single-source procurement' in a number of situations, including where procurement from 
a particular supplier is required for purposes of standardisation or compatibility. 
115  See Case C-385/02 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic OJ C 
323 of 21.12.2002 (ECJ held that since original contracts awarded in 1982 and 1988, 
agency could not in 1997 award contract to same contractor on the ground of repetition of 
similar work). See also Brown 2005 PPLR. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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4.3.3  Amendments to existing contracts 
The use of single source procurement may be justified in the case of 
amendments being made to an existing contract. It is suggested, however, that 
in such a case, much will depend on the nature and scope of amendments 
made. If amendments give rise to the creation of an entirely new contract or a 
contract that is substantially different from the one initially advertised and 
concluded, it may well, from a fairness and competitiveness point of view, be 
necessary for an organ of state to make use of public tender procedures. This 
will, however, depend on the concrete circumstances of each and every 
case.
116  
 
4.3.4  A need for proper safeguards 
In all the above instances (intellectual property rights, necessary additional and 
unforeseen work, and amendments to existing contracts), making use of 
competitive procedures, and this includes tender procedures, is likely to lead to 
greater costs incurred. The principle of cost-effectiveness and efficiency may 
therefore warrant the non-use of competition, that is, a tender call, or the use of 
single source procurement. It is important, however, for proper safeguards to 
be in place where use is made of single source procurement. A claim, for 
example, that there is only one potential provider for the particular goods or 
services should be fully justified and supported by detailed and compelling 
evidence.
117 Organs of state should not, for example, be allowed to award 
custom-made contracts, that is, contracts that are “tailored to the strengths of a 
particular supplier”.
118 Such contracts clearly defeat compliance with, in 
                                            
116   For a detailed examination of the rules that apply to the amendment of government 
procurement contracts,  see Bolton Government Procurement ch 7, par 5.2. See also 
Bolton 2006 Stell LR.  
117  For a detailed overview of the manner in which organs of state could be required to justify 
the use of single source procurement, see US FAR 6.303 which generally deals with 
justifications for procurement other than by way of full and open competition.  
118  Fontanot 2005 http://www.accountancysa.org.za/ 28 Oct.  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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particular, the principles of fairness and competitiveness in section 217(1) of 
the Constitution. 
 
The onus is further on organs of state to prove that no reasonable alternative or 
substitute exists for the goods or services in question.
119 In a United States 
case, for example, the Treasury Department (US Mint) held the United States 
marketing rights to the Olympic Commemorative Coin program. Maison Lazard, 
however, held the international marketing rights. Maison Lazard used coin 
cases manufactured by Unique Packaging Sales Corporation, which would be 
sold in the United States. The Treasury Department, deciding it had a need for 
many coin cases, contracted with Unique Packaging Sales Corporation on a 
sole source basis for thousands of cases. Another supplier, Design Pak 
Incorporated, then protested to the General Accounting Office and filed suit in 
the United States District Court arguing that the award was improper because 
other producers could meet all the requirements of the Treasury. The General 
Accounting Office ruled that the contracting officer's determination that only one 
offeror's product met the government's needs and alternate products could not 
be delivered in sufficient time was not an adequate justification for a sole 
source award. The General Accounting Office stated:  
 
[w]e believe that Treasury confused its minimum need for a 
presentation case that satisfied its performance requirements with 
the characteristics...of [Unique Packaging Sales Corporation’s] 
particular case which happened to satisfy those requirements.  
 
At least one other supplier had indicated that it could produce 190,000 coin 
cases per week.
120 The General Accounting Office ruled that – 
                                            
119  See cl 4.5 in the Green Paper on Public Sector Procurement Reform where it is proposed 
that insofar as the appointment of consultants is concerned, “[t]he appointment of sole 
service providers should be permitted, subject to adequate justification on the grounds of 
the scarcity of their skills and experience, value for money being obtained, and the 
likelihood that the outcome of the assignment would be compromised without such a 
selection”. See also Case C-57/94 Commission of the European Communities v Italian 
Republic [1995] ECR I-01249 (ECJ held that derogations from prescribed procurement 
processes are exceptional; awarding authorities face a heavy burden to prove the 
existence of the relevant circumstances warranting derogation).  
120  See  also  Sabreliner Corp Comp Gen Dec B-288030 et al. 2001 CPD 170 (held that 
agency’s proposed award of sole source contract for engineering and overhaul services P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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in these circumstances, we believe that Treasury was required to 
solicit for alternative approaches that might have satisfied its need 
for an appropriate [coin] case....Had this been done, the forces of 
competition might well have encouraged offerors to use their 
ingenuity and inventiveness in proposing designs and approaches 
that could also have satisfied Treasury's actual needs....A decision 
to make a sole-source award is unreasonable if the agency had 
adequate time to assess its needs and conduct a more competitive 
procurement...but failed to do so or otherwise took improper action 
which created the urgency.
121  
 
The District Court in this case had issued a temporary restraining order 
blocking performance, pending receipt of the General Accounting Office's 
decision. After receiving the decision that upheld the protest, that court however 
dismissed the action on the ground that it lacked jurisdiction to permanently 
enjoin the contract actions in post-award bid protests.
122 
 
                                                                                                                               
for helicopter engines on the basis that only one firm was capable of meeting agency’s 
needs not reasonable where agency’s documentation, including submissions prepared in 
response to the protest, and agency testimony at the hearing were inconsistent and 
inaccurate). 
121  Design Pak Inc B-212, 579, 83-2 CPD 336. See also National Aerospace Group Inc B-
282, 843, 99-2 CPD 43 (held that agency’s justification for sole-source procurement 
inadequate where documentation does not reasonably show that only this exact product 
will satisfy agency’s needs, and does not show that agency’s need for the item is of 
unusual and compelling urgency that was not created by a lack of advance planning). 
See, however, Essex Electro Engineers Inc B-250, 437, 93-1 CPD 74 (held that agency’s 
decision to limit urgent non-competitive procurement for diesel engine electric power 
plants to one source was reasonable and not the result of a lack of advance procurement 
planning where the power plants were urgently needed to correct an unacceptable level of 
military readiness in the Patriot Missile System; the power plants were readily available 
from only one source, and any delay on the part of the agency in initiating the acquisition 
was the result of reasonable deliberation that resulted in limiting the acquisition to the 
minimum number of power plants necessary to satisfy the urgent requirements). See also 
Greenbier Industries Inc B-241304, 91-1 CPD 336 (protest against sole-source award of 
contract for chemical protective suits denied where contracting agency reasonably 
determined that only one company was capable of expeditiously providing a suit 
amenable to use in “Operation Desert Shield”). 
122  Design Pak Inc v Regan DC DC No 83-2628 9/16/83. See, however, B-225400 December 
12 1986 (since sole-source award improperly justified, protestor entitled to recover costs 
of pursuing protest). See also American Sterilizer Company 64 Comp Gen 868 (1985). In 
Comp Gen B-223914 (Oct 1986) (unpublished), the protestor was able to recover the 
costs of pursuing the protest, including attorney fees, where the agency failed to show 
that its urgent circumstances prevented it from requesting offers from as many potential 
sources as was practicable prior to making a sole source award on the basis of urgency.  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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In the case of the recent City of Cape Town 'jewellery city contract',
123 the onus 
will be on the City of Cape Town to prove that the non-use of tender procedures 
was justified. The City will have to prove by way of detailed and compelling 
evidence that (as allegedly claimed) the successful contractor was the only 
expert in the field, and that the contract was of an urgent nature. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
By nature, a public call for tenders has the potential to ensure compliance with 
all the principles in section 217(1) of the Constitution. It is important, therefore, 
for there to be clear guidelines for the non-use of tendering as a procurement 
method. At present (30 April 2006), legislation at all three levels of government 
prescribes that, subject to certain exceptions, contracts with a high value 
(above R200 000) are subject to public tender procedures. Most relevant, is 
that organs of state need not call for tenders in the case of 'emergencies', when 
a call for tenders is 'impractical', and/or in the case of a 'sole supplier'. Little 
guidance is, however, provided on what would amount to 'emergencies', when 
tendering may be 'impractical', and when use may be made of 'sole suppliers'. 
 
The aim of this article has been to make recommendations on how the relevant 
legislative provisions should be interpreted in order to align them with the 
principles in section 217(1) of the Constitution. With reference to a number of 
international instruments, it was suggested that tendering may be 'impractical' 
when tender specifications are not known to an organ of state. A public call for 
tenders requires an organ of state to draw up detailed specifications so that 
interested parties are able to submit responsive tenders. If an organ of state is 
unable to specify its needs, the use of tendering is clearly impractical. 
Tendering may also be 'impractical' when there has been a call for tenders but 
no tenders were received or 'inappropriate' or 'unacceptable' tenders were 
received. Tenders will be 'inappropriate' or 'unacceptable' if, for example, the 
                                            
123  See par 4.3.1 supra. P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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prices offered were too high; unacceptable technical solutions were offered; 
none of the tenders received complied with the specifications and conditions of 
the tender call; and/or there has been collusion in the submission of tenders. 
Reasons of national security could also justify the non-use of tender 
procedures. When an organ of state is in need of professional advice or 
services, a public call for tenders may similarly be 'impractical'. An organ of 
state may not necessarily know the nature, extent or scope of the services to 
be performed, for example, in the case of research and development, policy 
formulation, human resource development, community-based developments 
and the like. 
 
Examples of emergencies may include, inter alia, the likelihood of human injury 
or death; the likelihood of damage to property, or suffering and death of 
livestock and animals; the likelihood of serious damage occurring to the natural 
environment; and/or the possibility that the security of the state could be 
compromised. Organs of state should not, however, be allowed to make use of 
emergency procurement procedures if the circumstances giving rise to the 
emergency were in fact foreseeable, or are the result of negligence, for 
example, inadequate planning. The fact that an organ of state is unable to use 
public tender procedures also does not mean that it can do away with 
competition all together – it may still be able to make use of some other 
competition, for example, a call for quotations.  
 
The use of tendering may clearly be inappropriate where there is only one 
provider for the particular goods or services, for example, in the case of 
intellectual property rights such as patents, trademarks or copyrights. Single 
source procurement may also be appropriate where necessary additional and 
unforeseen work needs to be carried out under an existing contract, and the 
work cannot be technically separated from the main contract without great 
inconvenience. Single source procurement may further be warranted in the 
case of amendments made to existing contracts. In such instances, however, 
much will depend on the scope of amendments made. Generally, amendments 
should not give rise to an entirely new contract or a contract that is substantially 
different from the contract initially advertised.  P BOLTON    PER 2006(2) 
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The use of single source procurement by organs of state may thus be 
warranted in certain circumstances. Of all the procurement methods, however, 
single source procurement has the potential to defeat compliance with all the 
principles in the Constitution. It is important, therefore, for proper safeguards to 
be in place. A claim that there is only one provider for the particular goods or 
services should be fully justified and supported by compelling evidence. The 
onus is also on an organ of state to prove that no reasonable alternative or 
substitute exists for the goods or services in question. 
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